نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار، دانشگاه کردستان-دانشکده علوم انسانی و اجتماعی-گروه معارف اسلامی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The views of theologians and jurists regarding the permissibility of the principle of taklīf mā lā yutāq (obligation beyond capacity) on the part of God—as well as the possibility or impossibility and moral evaluation (good or evil) of such obligation—have long been subjects of scholarly debate. Those who argue for its impossibility or ethical inadmissibility not only rely on rational arguments but also cite several scriptural evidences from the Qur'an, among which the well-known phrase "Lā yukallifu Allāhu nafsan illā wusʿahā" (“God does not burden any soul beyond its capacity”) in the final verse of Sūrat al-Baqara stands out. This verse serves as one of the fundamental bases for analyzing the issue. Furthermore, disagreement over the meaning of the term wusʿ and the scope of its referents in the interpretation of this verse holds particular significance. The present study aims to examine the status of the principle of taklīf mā lā yutāq in terms of its feasibility, impossibility, and moral valuation, as well as its implications for legal reasoning. Through a descriptive-analytical method and by exploring the views of jurists and exegetes, the research clarifies the concept and scope of wusʿ. In addition to elaborating on the various dimensions of the principle, this study undertakes a comparative analysis of differing perspectives and extracts more precise conclusions regarding the impact of this principle on a deeper understanding of the foundations of divine legislation and justice. It concludes that the semantic scope of wusʿ is comprehensive, encompassing all physical, mental, intellectual, and social human capacities, and that attributing obligation beyond capacity to God is unfounded.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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